Pressure Points: Economic and Political Influence on EPA Enforcement Decisions by Judy, Logan
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pressure Points: Economic and Political Influence on EPA Enforcement 
Decisions  
Logan Judy 
 
 
A Thesis submitted to the 
faculty of the University of 
North Carolina 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of a degree with 
Honors in 
Political 
Science 
2016
  
 
  
 
Abstract 
 
Environmental legislation in the United States is intended to serve the 
public interest by shielding the environment from the byproducts of 
industrialization and development. The Environmental Protection Agency exercises 
some discretion in its enforcement decisions. This paper answers the question: Do 
factors such as a depressed economy in a certain area systematically influence EPA 
enforcement actions? To answer this question, EPA violations from 2010-2015 are 
analyzed via an ordered probit model in order to determine whether the economic 
health and the political profile in a particular congressional district serve as 
predictors for EPA enforcement severity, with the results indicating a positive 
relationship between economic prosperity and EPA enforcement level, as well as a 
negative relationship between LCV scores of members of Congress and EPA 
enforcement level.
  
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Towards the latter half of the twentieth century, environmental policies and 
issues rose to prominence in mainstream American politics. With the advent of 
environmental legislation and regulation firms were forced to be more responsible 
in terms of emissions and pollution in order to yield higher net benefits for society 
while minimizing detrimental societal costs.  The passage of environmental 
legislation was only the first step in a lengthy regulation process. Indeed, the 
passage of legislation was the quickest step in the process—once environmental 
laws were passed was when the strenuous task of environmental enforcement was 
left to the executive branch of the United States government. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), since its creation in 1970, 
has served as the chief federal enforcement body for environmental legislation and 
regulations. The EPA, like any federal agency, has discretion in which cases that it 
chooses to pursue. While there are codified environmental standards that respective 
firms must adhere to, the respective sanctioning regime is not automatic in its 
sanction prescription. The EPA selects which cases to pursue for formal 
sanctioning and which to settle with an informal enforcement: such as a written 
warning. If the agency had no discretion over when to enforce or what type of 
enforcement action to use, then the story of EPA enforcement would be a 
straightforward one with little room for interpretation.  However, the EPA, like any 
agency, is not an entity with totally pre-prescribed systematic penalties for each 
violation. The question arises: what outside factors may influence the enforcement 
process of the EPA? It is in the best interest of any democratic constituency to 
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understand what the driving forces are behind discretionary enforcement in order to 
determine if a publicly funded agency is accountable to the voice of the people, as 
best represented in laws passed by Congress by popularly elected representatives. 
As environmental issues came to the forefront of political debate in the 
1960s and 1970s, opposition to new environmental standards emerged from key 
stakeholders. The fundamental disagreement arose over the tradeoff between 
environmental protection and firm profit and efficiency. Corporations that rely on 
production or extraction, whether embodied in textiles, oil drilling, mining, etc., 
will naturally be large stakeholders when it comes to EPA regulations that provide 
environmental standards that may reduce production or hurt a firm’s bottom line. 
Regulations enforced by the EPA may very well clean up the environment, but 
often times do so by sacrificing economic prosperity manifested in lost firm profit 
or the loss of jobs.  Regions that rely on emitting industry for economic livelihood 
are placed in a gauntlet of decision making—forced to compromise between 
economic prosperity and the preservation of the environment, both of which are 
salient issues to any region or community. 
Herein lies the political dilemma: is the EPA, a theoretical third party 
enforcer of environmental standards, truly an impartial enforcer? Or do other 
conditions and factors, such as local characteristics of the area in which the firm is 
located affect decisions across the nation? Does the social climate in which the 
EPA operates, exemplified by factors such as changes in political and economic 
conditions nationwide over time, influence enforcement decisions? With an 
increasing number of EPA regulations on the books, it is impossible for the 
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agency to formally enforce every regulation for each violation that is brought 
under their jurisdiction.  The question thus arises: why does the EPA, a federal 
agency with some level of enforcement discretion, choose to formally enforce 
regulations in certain areas while not in others? 
In order to examine EPA enforcement behavior, I will analyze enforcement 
data along with the local characteristics of the congressional district in which each 
respective firm in violation of EPA standards is located. This analysis will reveal 
what characteristics are significant indicators of EPA formal enforcement as well 
as which are indicators of informal enforcement. In addition, in order to determine 
why formal enforcement is sought against violators in some cases and not in 
others, I will examine how the trends in enforcement have changed over time as 
political and economic shifts happen on a macro level. 
My method consists of compiling data and characteristics into an ordered 
probit regression model to predict which factors are significant indicators of EPA 
formality in enforcement. In addition I will use linear regression to examine the 
relationship between EPA budget and overall enforcement action. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
EPA oversight, while a relatively new phenomenon to the study of political 
science, is one that is extensively examined. Environmental protection is an 
increasingly salient issue to the United States in the twenty first century. 
Bosch, Eckard, and Lee (1998) in their analysis show what firms do when 
under EPA enforcement. Taking a sample of 525 cases involving 244 firms 
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between 1970 (the creation of the EPA) and 1990, the analysis was conducted 
taking the costs incurred by firms that were under EPA scrutiny The sample of 
cases is drawn from The Wall Street Journal Index, extracting any mention of the 
EPA and US corporations (Bosch et al 1998, 168). The analysis specifically 
focuses on the cost and benefits of affected firms when dealing with the EPA by 
breaking the firms into four subgroups: targeted firms, losers, winners, and 
challengers (Bosch, Eckard, Lee 1998, 169). Cases are coded into the “targeted” 
category if the EPA investigated, cited, or charged a firm during the period. 
“Losers” consist of firms that had to close or alter operations due to EPA citations, 
firms that lost a legal battle to the EPA, or firms that chose to settle with the EPA. 
“Winners” are coded as such when the EPA either endorses a firm’s operations, or 
recants previous allegations of misconduct. The final category of “challengers” 
contains those who chose to fight EPA rulings or enforcement actions (Bosch, 
Eckard, Lee 1998, 169). 
Using standard event-time analysis with the CRSP value-weighted index 
and individual firm daily returns, this study was able to project the impact of EPA 
action on the stock prices of these corporations in conflict with EPA regulations 
(Bosch et al 1998, 169). With this analysis, it is shown that in general the market 
reacts negatively upon learning that a particular firm has been targeted by the EPA.  
Targeted firms experienced a -0.52% mean drop in stock price—indicating a loss of 
investor confidence in the firm to emerge from EPA negotiations without incurring 
significant costs (Bosch et al 1998, 171). This overall trend in stock price holds for 
“losers” (-1.04% investor return at the announcement window).  Perhaps most 
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surprising, is the returns for a firm that is deemed a “winner” are actually negative 
despite having won a battle with the EPA, although this result is statistically weak 
and not significant at the 10% level (Bosch et al, 171). These findings taken 
together suggest that firms receiving formal enforcement via the EPA pay real 
economic costs both from the EPA as well as from private investors who may lose 
confidence in a firm—suggesting the true economic power that the EPA holds over 
violating firms (Bosch et al 1998, 176). 
Hunter and Waterman (1992) offer another perspective on EPA 
enforcement on more of a theoretical level. They present two competing models for 
agency enforcement: the “enforced compliance model” and the “negotiated 
compliance model”. The enforced compliance model assumes oversight that is 
strict in nature with clearly defined standards and regulations with constant 
enforcement options that are employed. The negotiated compliance model gives 
more discretion in oversight, allowing for more interpretation of standards as well 
as flexibility in guidelines and enforcement mechanisms (Hunter and Waterman 
1992, 403-05).  The authors take these two definitions of agency oversight and 
enforcement and apply them to the EPA enforcement structure as manifested in the 
EPA Clean Water Office. The Clean Water Office offers a wealth of coded cases 
gathered under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). 
This dataset contains each enforcement action by the EPA from 1980- 88, totaling 
around 27,000 cases (Hunter and Waterman 1992, 406-07). Hunter and Waterman 
emphasize that the EPA faces an inherent tradeoff in their enforcement, balancing 
the uniformity of regulatory activity nationally with the unique challenges faced 
6  
 
  
 
regionally in the United States. It is this consideration that led the EPA to 
decentralizing oversight to state governments in 37 states (Hunter and Waterman 
1992, 407-08). 
In order to discern the enforcement structure of the EPA, the authors 
code EPA actions on a scale of 0-7 with 0-2 representing informal enforcement 
actions, 3-5 indicating unilateral EPA action, and the 6-7 range encompassing 
legal action against violators (Hunter and Waterman 1992, 410). Once the data is 
analyzed, 2 is the modal response of EPA enforcement, accounting for 40.2% of 
the total dataset. In addition, in only 7% of the cases was legal action taken 
against the violator (Hunter and Waterman 1992, 411). The modal response, 2, 
is indicative of the enforcement structure of the EPA. This level encompasses 
enforcement actions such as a warning letter, or an informal notice of violation, 
indicating that in most cases the EPA chooses a flexible punishment that is not a 
predetermined sanction on the violator, but rather varying depending on the case 
(Hunter and Waterman 1992, 411). The data was also broken up regionally in 
order to discern any sort of regional divergence in enforcement methods.  The 
range of the mean value was noticeable: 4.24 being the highest average, 
contained in region 4, as well as 1.57 being the lowest recorded average for 
Region 1. This sort of regional variation suggests less of a systematic 
enforcement mechanism for the EPA over the scope of the entire nation, directly 
indicating negotiated compliance as the enforcement model for the EPA (Hunter 
and Waterman 1992, 415). The concept of the “negotiated compliance model” 
aids my paper greatly.  It is this way of thinking about agency oversight that 
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guides my hypotheses to follow. In addition, Hunter and Waterman’s system of 
coding inspires my ordinal measure of EPA enforcement severity employed in 
my ordered probit model. 
Deily and Gray (1991) examined the relationship between the EPA and 
the steel industry from 1977-1986. They hypothesized that the EPA would direct 
less enforcement activity toward plants that were in danger of closing, or plants 
that were located in areas where closing would harm employment levels and the 
economy. Using data on 49 steel plants and the areas surrounding them, their 
regression model produced results aligning closely with their hypotheses (Deily 
and Gray 1991, 261). They found conclusive evidence that enforcement behavior 
is influenced by the potential adjustment costs to local communities. Results 
showed that enforcement activity drops 6.5% for each 10 percentage point 
increase in the firm’s probability of closing (Deily and Gray, 269).  This clearly 
shows that EPA enforcement activity is sensitive to the possibility of disrupting 
local economies. Deily and Gray found that the EPA allocates enforcement 
resources and attention in a way that minimizes adjustment costs in localities 
where violating plants are located (Deily and Gray, 271). My theory builds off of 
Deily and Gray’s argument, predicting a model of EPA enforcement that is 
responsive to the ebbs and flows of local economies. 
In addition to literature on EPA enforcement, my analysis will build upon 
research in the field of study on Congressional influence. Shipan and Lowry 
(2001) examine changes in Congressional voting during a 30 year span, 
specifically targeting environmental issues. The authors seek to examine the 
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causes of divergence in party politics since 1970, viewed through the lens of 
environmental political behavior. Their data consists of interest group ratings from 
the League of Conservation Voters, a non- profit, non-partisan group in order to 
determine each member of Congress’ views on environmental issues. The scores 
range from 0 to 100, 0 being no support and 100 being full support for 
environmental legislation (Shipan and Lowry 2001, 248). The dataset consists of 
16,000 observations ranging from 1969-1999 for the Senate, 1970-1999 for the 
House (Shipan and Lowry 2001, 249). The authors note that they must control for 
inter-temporal changes and normalize through two parameters: a shift parameter as 
well as a stretch parameter they use 1980 as the base year, take the nominal score 
and subtract the shift parameter, the left-right shift needed to normalize, and then 
divide by the stretch parameter, the stretch or compression needed to normalize 
the data (Shipan and Lowry 2001, 249-50). The author’s main hypothesis is that 
the two major parties are diverging over time manifested in 6 sub-hypotheses: 
H1: The higher the percentage of Democrats who are from the South, the 
closer ideologically the party will be to the Republicans and therefore the 
smaller the divergence in environmental voting scores. 
H2: The more active the interest groups supporting factions with strong 
views, the greater the divergence between party voting scores. 
H3: When the salience of an issue increases, ideological factions are 
more constrained, thus leading to reduced divergence between the 
two parties. 
H4: The worse the condition of the economy, the lower the divergence 
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between the two parties on environmental voting. 
H5: The more replacement in each term, the greater the divergence 
between the two parties on environmental voting. 
H6: When Ideological differences between members of different parties are 
higher, divergence in voting on specific issues will be larger. 
After multivariate analysis is complete, they find several key trends in the 
divergence of parties. In the House, broad ideological scores correlate with 
environmental voting. When salience increases, voting in the House converges 
between the two respective parties (p<.05). The higher number of freshmen, the 
more divergence in both chambers of Congress(p<.05). In the Senate, four out of 
six variables are significant.  The lower percent of southerners in Democratic 
party, the wider the convergence. The stronger presence of interest groups, the 
wider the divergence. As well as in the Senate, when there is higher inflation, 
there is less divergence. When regressed for ideology, there are similar results 
with interest group activity positive and significant in both chambers (Shipan and 
Lowry 2001, 258-259). 
Shipan and Lowry’s research on party divergence, while not directly related 
to my analysis of EPA enforcement trends, contains important methods for me to 
explore in my own research. Their method of coding LCV ratings for Congress 
proves to be a measure used in my analysis of Congress and the influence of 
ideology on decisions reached within Congress. LCV scorecards are reliable and 
consistent measures of ideology, especially within the realm of environmental 
policy.  Deily and Gray offer analysis that is most comparable to my theoretical 
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model regarding EPA enforcement.  Their key finding that the EPA allocates 
enforcement decisions so as to minimize adjustment costs to firms is a crucial tenet 
of my own theory of enforcement; my theory is centered around the concept of 
EPA sensitivity to economic conditions in the allocation of enforcement actions.  I 
hope to expand upon their findings to capture a more complete picture of EPA 
enforcement that takes into account budgetary, economic, as well as political 
factors. 
There is a plethora of research and analysis conducted on the mechanisms 
present within the EPA. There is however a lapse in research on the influence of 
local characteristics on EPA enforcement. In general, only the opposite 
relationship is explored—how EPA sanctions and punishment affect firms and 
localities. I am more interested in how the EPA caters its enforcement efforts 
around the state of local economies and politics—either to avoid upsetting the 
economy, or to avoid a legal battle. 
Theory 
 
This paper seeks to discover the causal mechanisms that drive EPA 
enforcement. While the EPA has explicit standards for emitting firms, the agency 
exercises discretion in choosing when to enforce violations, as well as the severity 
of the punishment prescribed. I pose that the economic situation within a district 
as well as the profile of each respective member of Congress may influence the 
EPA enforcement mechanism.  My hypothesis is broken into three sub-hypotheses 
(economic, budgetary, ideological) each examining a different facet of EPA 
enforcement and the causal mechanisms that drive this enforcement regime within 
11  
 
  
 
each of the respective 435 congressional districts, with my hypotheses listed at the 
end of the theory section. 
My theory posits that the EPA will systematically choose to implement less 
severe EPA enforcement actions in areas where such an action could destabilize the 
economy. This is supported by the “negotiated compliance model” of enforcement 
which assumes a world of agency enforcement in which agencies have some degree 
of discretion over enforcement actions, meaning that the sanctions for a violation 
are not pre-prescribed and subject to discretion based on a variety of factors 
(Hunter and Waterman 1992). Upon observation, I presume that the EPA is not a 
neutral third party enforcement body, but rather an agency that is susceptible to 
outside political pressures, the same political pressures generally associated with 
the executive branch and Congress. 
While environmental protection is the primary aim of EPA enforcement, I 
propose that the issues of employment and economic health in a locality will play a 
significant role in the decision making process of the EPA. I propose that the EPA, 
while traditionally viewed as devoted solely to environmental enforcement, will be 
more lenient to firms when congressional districts are experiencing high 
unemployment and overall poverty, thus placing economic concerns above 
environmental enforcement when economic issues are most important to a district 
(indicated by lower household income and higher district unemployment).  The 
resulting behavior according to my theory will be that the EPA will be less likely to 
enforce formal sanctions and judicial proceedings towards violating firms when 
economic concerns are most pressing, such as during an economic downturn. 
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The aim of environmental legislation and enforcement is to provide for a 
cleaner environment through the use of varying standards, including emission 
standards for industrial firms. However, I propose that the EPA, as an extension of 
the executive branch, will naturally be inclined to weigh their enforcement 
decision at least partly on the perceived outcome of enforcement. If violations 
occur when unemployment is high and wages are low within a respective district, I 
posit that the EPA will be more likely to employ informal enforcement rather than 
more severe formal or judicial proceedings to prevent further injury to a weakened 
economy. 
I theorize that during the time period 2000-2015, increasing EPA strength 
can be traced through the size of the EPA budget, as well as through the overall 
frequency of enforcement actions. My theory predicts that as the EPA 
enforcement budget rises, so will overall enforcement, since a larger budget will 
expand institutional capacity to employ enforcement. In addition, I predict that a 
rise in average LCV in the House will be associated with a rise in EPA 
enforcement budget. 
My ideological characteristics hypothesis posits that congressional districts 
represented by members of Congress that are hostile to environmental groups and 
interests will be less likely to encounter more formal forms of EPA enforcement. 
Since these legislators presumably favor industrial interests over environmental 
interests, as reflected through low League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores, 
the EPA will be more hesitant to target their respective congressional home 
districts due to the threat of legislative action against the EPA. In order to analyze 
13  
 
  
 
this trend further, I also hypothesize that the prominence and position of each 
member within Congress will also affect EPA enforcement decisions— as the EPA 
would be more sensitive to their most powerful opponents in Congress. I plan to 
trace this by incorporating the number of terms served in my ordered probit model 
with the aim of capturing prominence and influence in Congress as a function of 
the number of terms served. 
Congress, which holds the “power of the purse”, has the ability to constrict 
the EPA budget in an effort to limit more formal enforcement actions if legislators 
feel that their home districts are systematically harmed by EPA actions.  Congress, 
through the power of appropriations can threaten to slash EPA operations, which is 
more likely when members of Congress feel that their respective district is being 
targeted by the EPA.  Therefore, the EPA has an interest in appealing somewhat to 
the sentiments of legislators from industrial-friendly districts in order to prevent 
their administrative activities from being restrained by Congress.  In addition, I 
argue that industry-friendly legislators are less likely to favor any legislative 
agenda that strengthens the EPA’s enforcement model since in doing so, it would 
jeopardize the economic and political interests of these legislators who align 
themselves with pro-industrial interests. 
My overall theory is tied to the idea that League of Conservation 
Scorecards, which are compiled annually, can be used as a valuable and 
consistent measure of the environmental ideology of each member of Congress. 
My conceptual model assumes that LCV scores will show the attitudes of each 
respective member of Congress in each district in each year—which I will use as 
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an indicator of that member’s ideology as well as the collective attitude of the 
constituents represented by that member, since a representative is namely that—a 
representative of the collective attitudes of his or hers constituency, particularly in 
the realm of environmental legislation. 
 
 
 
Economic Characteristics Hypothesis: A weaker district economy, as indicated 
by high unemployment and low median income levels, will receive EPA 
enforcement that is less strict, as the EPA is less likely to punish firms harshly 
during economic downturns. 
Budgetary Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between the EPA 
enforcement budget and the total number of enforcement actions per year, as 
expenditures increase so should enforcement activity. Associated with a rise in 
EPA enforcement budget should be a pro- environmental trend in the House of 
Representatives, indicated by a rise in average annual LCV score for the chamber. 
Ideological Characteristics Hypothesis: Congressional districts with members 
of Congress who are hostile to environmental legislation, as measured through the 
League of Conservation scorecard, will generally experience less severe EPA 
enforcement actions in their respective home districts. 
 
 
Method 
 
The EPA data used in this paper is drawn from the Enforcement 
Compliance History Online Database (ECHO). I chose to use the Federal 
Enforcement and Compliance (FE&C) data from the Integrated Compliance 
15  
 
  
 
Information System (ICIS) due to the depth of information given for each case as 
well as the facility information linked to this data through the Facility Registry 
Service (FRS). The unique case number for each EPA violation in the FE&C-ICIS 
matches the data in the FRS to provide a street address for a vast majority of 
facilities which was used to place the facilities on a map in order to eventually tie 
them to their respective congressional district in the particular year that the 
violation was recorded. 
In order to assign each violating firm to a congressional district, I used 
ArcGIS to plot the firms onto a map of the United States using information 
provided in the FRS spreadsheets provided by the EPA’s enforcement compliance 
database: ECHO. I narrowed down the close to one million violations reported by 
the EPA since 1970 into approximately 26,000 cases encompassing the years 2010-
2015.
1
 
Since the FRS spreadsheets I used were consolidated from several different 
 
agencies, the pivotal fields that I required in order to obtain (x,y) coordinates for 
firm location were difficult to extrapolate for certain entries in the spreadsheet. 
Before I could begin geocoding, I cleaned the data and narrowed down the 
variables listed to encompass only the case number, street address, city, state, and 
ZIP code for each entry. Once the data was “clean”, I put my condensed excel file 
into ArcGIS to match the firms by respective street address. Many of the street 
addresses for each entry were either incorrect, too vague, or simply blank, so after 
this process of plugging in 26,000 cases in to geocode, I was still left with some 
“unmatched” locations, but was able to retain over 90% of the cases for the period 
                                                            
1 See Appendix A for details in the coding process. 
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2010-2015. 
Once I obtained the precise location of each of the thousands of EPA 
violations for the period 2010-2015, I then began to gather and code data for the 
variables of interest in the categories of EPA, District, and congressional factors 
which were each coded by year.
2
 
Variables 
 
My dependent variable is the ordinal variable measuring the level of EPA 
enforcement employed in each case (Informal, Formal, Judicial which will be 
coded 0-2). This ordinal measure was adopted from the EPA, as each enforcement 
action in their database is categorized in this way. My explanatory variables are 
contained in three categories. First are variables associated with the EPA.  The 
second category encompasses variables associated with district characteristics.  
The third category encompasses characteristics of Congress in each district.
3
 
EPA 
 
Variable Variable Type Variable Value 
Year Interval 2010-2015 
Region Nominal 1-10 
Enforcement Type Ordinal 0-2 
EPA Annual Budget Interval $ value 
EPA Enforcement Budget Interval $ value 
 
District Characteristics  
 
Variable Variable Type Variable Value 
Per Capita GDP Interval $ value 
Unemployment Rate Interval % 
District Ideology Interval % vote for Obama in 
previous election 
 
                                                            
2 See Appendix A. 
3 See Appendix B. 
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Congress 
 
Variable Variable Type Variable Value 
Member of Congress Party ID Dummy 1 Rep, 0 Dem 
MoC Terms in Office Interval Positive Integer 
MoC Environmental Rating 
(LCV) 
Interval 0-100 
 
 
I chose to use the ordinal enforcement measure employed by the EPA in 
my own analysis which yielded three categories: informal enforcement, formal 
enforcement, as well as judicial proceedings. Due to the ordinal measure of the 
dependent variable, an ordered probit model was employed to best capture the 
characteristics of the dataset. First, I modeled without any control variables for 
time effects or EPA region. In my next model, which is the one presented in this 
paper, I controlled for both changes in time (year) as well as variance across the 
10 EPA regions—with my results yielding almost identical results suggesting the 
robustness of my model. 
After completing my ordered probit model to test the economic 
characteristics hypothesis and the ideological characteristics hypothesis, I 
created a linear model to examine my budgetary hypothesis. For this model I 
had very few data points. I recorded the total number of EPA enforcements, 
regardless of severity, for the years 2000-2015. In addition I recorded the annual 
average LCV score for the House of Representatives for each of the 16 years 
studied. 
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Results and Analysis 
District Characteristics: Economic Factors 
Overall, district characteristics prove to be the most consistent predictor of 
EPA enforcement activity. With regards to median income, there is a positive 
relationship between median district income and enforcement level that is 
significant at the .000 level (see table 1). Thus when median income is higher, so is 
the likelihood of higher levels of enforcement—which is consistent with my theory 
surrounding EPA enforcement and economic conditions. When a district is 
healthier in economic terms, as indicated by higher median household income, then 
formal environmental enforcement will be higher since there is likely less worry 
about formal enforcement actions harming an already healthy economy. 
Unemployment rate at both the national and the district level displays a 
negative correlation with regards to enforcement level, with both measures 
significant at the .000 level (see table 1). This negative relationship between 
unemployment rate and enforcement level is consistent with my theory regarding 
the effect of local economic conditions on EPA enforcement decisions. When 
unemployment rates are relatively higher, my model suggests that the average 
enforcement level decreases—indicating the EPA’s responsiveness to volatile 
economic conditions by pulling back on formal enforcement and issuing more 
informal enforcement decisions. The inverse relationship is also logical using my 
theoretical framework; when unemployment is lower and the economy is in better 
health, then the EPA is more likely to issue more severe forms of punishments to 
violating industries. Both unemployment and median household income display 
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effects consistent with my first hypothesis: 
Economic Characteristics Hypothesis: A weaker district economy, as 
indicated by high unemployment and low median income levels, will 
receive EPA enforcement that is less strict, as the EPA is less likely to 
punish firms harshly during economic downturns. 
Overall, both of the major economic indicators per congressional district reveal a 
model of enforcement that is responsive to local economic conditions. The positive 
association between median income and enforcement level coupled with the 
negative association between unemployment rate and enforcement level suggests 
that local economic conditions are consistent and significant indicators of EPA 
activity. With the knowledge that enforcement could possibly harm the local 
economy, the EPA will be more likely to resort to more informal enforcement 
actions when the economy is in peril in order to ensure economic stability. This 
responsiveness of the EPA to economic conditions could be a utilitarian response 
with the simple goal of economic stability, or as my theory might suggest, it may be 
a political move to decrease hostility towards the EPA at the grassroots level but 
more importantly at the congressional level—where the actions of legislators 
directly influence the EPA’s jurisdiction and enforcement capacity. 
District Characteristics: Ideological Factors 
 
In addition to economic indicators, ideological characteristics of 
congressional districts prove to be important factors in the prediction of the severity 
of EPA enforcement actions. District ideology, which is measured by taking the 
percentage of voters who voted for Obama in the previous election, has a positive 
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association with the level of EPA enforcement (see table 1).  Therefore, the higher 
the percentage of voters that chose Obama in the previous presidential election, the 
higher the likelihood of increased levels of EPA enforcement in any given district.  
This is consistent with my third hypothesis, as districts that are liberal ideologically 
will intuitively be linked to members of Congress with similar viewpoints—
resulting in pro-environmental legislators representing districts that receive more 
formal enforcement actions. 
Ideological Characteristics Hypothesis: Congressional districts with 
Members of Congress who are hostile to environmental legislation, as 
measured through the League of Conservation scorecard, will generally 
experience less severe EPA enforcement actions in their respective home 
districts. 
Districts that are more liberal, as measured by Obama’s vote share in the previous 
election, are more likely to have higher levels of enforcement while districts that 
are less liberal will, by the measure of vote share for Obama, receive less severe 
enforcement actions. This relationship is consistent with my theory that posits that 
districts with members of Congress who are more hostile to environmental 
legislation will experience less severe EPA enforcement actions. 
Congressional Characteristics 
 
Characteristics of the members of Congress produce a mixed effect within 
my model of EPA enforcement. Member of Congress ideology is a useful indicator 
of EPA enforcement with Democratic Party Identification statistically significant at 
the .000 level (see table 1).  There is a positive relationship between Democratic 
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Party Identification and the severity of EPA action implying that a district that is 
represented by a Democrat will be more likely to receive more severe EPA actions. 
This result is consistent with the previously mentioned relationship of overall 
district ideology and EPA enforcement— where a district with a member of 
Congress who identifies as a Democrat more likely to be associated with levels of 
EPA enforcement that are more severe. 
Member of Congress Party identification is the only congressional variable 
that is intuitive and easily extrapolated from my theory of EPA enforcement. 
Member of Congress LCV score displays a negative relationship with level of 
enforcement, significant at the .05 level (see table 1). This is not the result that was 
anticipated in my third hypothesis: 
Ideological Characteristics Hypothesis: Congressional districts with 
members of Congress who are hostile to environmental legislation, as 
measured through the League of Conservation scorecard, will generally 
experience less severe EPA enforcement actions in their respective home 
districts. 
In fact, my model suggests the opposite result, that the lower the LCV score (less 
friendly to environmental legislation), the higher the level of enforcement. Perhaps 
the aggregate level of industry is an unknown confounding variable that influences 
both the ideology of the member of Congress (LCV score) as well as the severity of 
enforcement. Further analysis will present a more complete picture of the 
interaction between LCV score and enforcement level, but under my current model 
it is clear that districts represented by legislators with lower LCV scores yield 
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higher severity of enforcement overall. 
The final congressional variable I examined, the importance of a member 
of Congress as measured through the number of terms served in Congress, proved 
to not be a predictor that was significant at the .05 level (see table 1). Perhaps this 
result has less to do with the utility of member importance as a predictor of EPA 
action and more to do with the “number of terms served” not serving as the best 
indicator for this variable. However, given the insignificance of this measure in my 
model, it suggests that the notoriety of any member of Congress on its own will 
not sway the severity of EPA measures employed in any respective district 
systematically. This suggests the existence of an EPA that is insulated from the 
individual power of individual legislators, at least on the aggregate level. 
EPA Characteristics 
 
Aside from the ordered probit model, a linear regression model measuring 
the effect of the annual mean LCV score for the House of Representatives as well 
as the EPA enforcement budget on the total number of annual enforcement actions 
forced a rejection of the second hypothesis: 
Budgetary Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between the EPA 
enforcement budget and the total number of enforcement actions per year, 
as expenditures increase so should enforcement activity. Associated with a 
rise in EPA enforcement budget should be a pro-environmental trend in the 
House of Representatives, indicated by a rise in average annual LCV score 
for the chamber. 
Both the mean annual LCV score as well as the EPA enforcement budget were not 
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statistically significant at the .05 level (see Table 2).   Table 2 also suggests that 
there is no significant collinearity at the root of the relationship between LCV 
score and EPA enforcement budget.  Perhaps as the EPA enforcement regime 
expands over time, it becomes more efficient, allowing for increased enforcement 
actions at a lower cost—thus helping to explain the lack of a strong positive 
relationship between the annual EPA enforcement budget and the aggregate 
number of annual EPA enforcement actions. 
Another possible explanation for the decline in formal enforcement actions, 
particularly in 2015, is the incompleteness of data. The EPA enforcement databases 
are massive and merge together data from all 50 states. There may be thousands of 
cases that will be dated for 2015 that simply have not been updated in the database, 
or enforcement actions that did not occur prior to my consolidation of EPA data 
around November of 2015. Additionally, the EPA offers no explanation of the 
completeness and reliability of the data that they provide, however my exploration 
of the data did not yield any sort of systematic trend in the incompleteness or 
inaccuracy of data.  Regionally, no significant trends arose regarding a discrepancy 
in the severity of enforcement within my model.   
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the ordered probit regression model indicates that the political 
and economic environment that the EPA operates within matters greatly in 
regards to the decisions and penalties agreed upon by the agency. The research 
suggests a tradeoff between economic health and environmental regulation 
where environmental regulation is implemented fully only when the economy 
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is in good health. While characteristics of Congress and individual 
representatives seem to matter to the conclusions of EPA cases, it is the 
political and economic characteristics of congressional districts that are the 
most consequential in influencing EPA enforcement actions. 
The Environmental Protection Agency, like other agencies in the U.S. 
Government, does not operate within a vacuum free from the pressures of politics 
and the economic plight of Americans. This paper explores the factors that 
systematically influence EPA enforcement actions not as an indictment against the 
agency, that in theory is supposed to be neutral, but rather in an effort to understand 
the discrepancies in enforcement as well as systematic patterns that arise at the 
aggregate level. 
Recognizing the different pressures placed upon the EPA is the first step in 
building a more efficient agency that works towards equitable enforcement despite 
the constant flow of political and economic influences. A more efficient and 
neutral EPA is in the public’s interest and may help to avert environmental 
disasters such as the recent water crisis in Flint, Michigan. 
This paper is not conclusive, and leaves many issues unexplored and 
questions unanswered. There are many other factors to be explored in regards to 
EPA enforcement, including a more thorough examination of the influence of 
lobbying on the decisions made by the EPA. A further breakdown of enforcement 
by industry may reveal more discrepancies in enforcement based upon more than 
district characteristics but also industry characteristics and practices.  Aside from 
the EPA, research of this type regarding disciplinary decisions reached by 
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administrative agencies may uncover systematic biases that affect the 
implementation of the law—which is something that affects not only those 
punished but also every federal taxpayer.
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Table 1:        Ordered Probit Model Results, Controlling for EPA 
Region and Year 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: ordinal values (enforcement level) 
Model: (Threshold), MOCLCV, MOCTerms, MOCParty, PercentVoteDemPresidential, UnemRateDis, 
UnemRateNatl, MedianHouseholdIncome 
Dummy variables for Region and Year are present, but suppressed. 
Number of observations included= 24,161 
Log Likelihood: -9714.502 
Akaike’s Information: 1945.004 
Bayesian Information: 19540.021 
 
 
Paremeter 
Parameter 
 
B 
B 
 
Std. Error 
Std. Error 
Sig. 
Threshold  [EnforcementLevel=.00(Informal] -9.046 .5389 .000 
[EnforcementLevel=1.00(formal] -6.327 .5366 .000 
MOCLCVScore -.001 .0005 .041 
MOCTermsServed -.001 .0022 .545 
[MOCParty=Democrat] .229 .0379 .000 
PercentVoteDemPresidential .006 .0008 .000 
UnemploymentRateDistrict -.018 .0030 .000 
UnemploymentRateNational -.163 .0225 .000 
MedianHouseholdIncome  
2.304E-5 
 
7.5485E-7 
 
.000 
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Table 2: Aggregate Enforcement Actions as Function of Mean LCV & EPA Enforcement 
Budget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Count of Enforcements 
b. Number of Observations: 16 
c. R Square= .244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Tolerance VIF 
    Constant 3511.786 11614.392 .302 .767 
  
AverageLCV 315.561 213.140 1.481 .163 .996 1.004 
EnforcementBudget -1.068E-5 .000 -1.327 .207 .996 1.004 
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Appendix A 
 
Coding 
 
The coding of EPA variables was a fairly straightforward task. Many of the 
categories such as the year the violation occurred, as well as the enforcement type 
were simply carried over from the ECHO Database. However, in order to create an 
ordinal coding system for the Level of Enforcement, I took the three types of 
enforcement given in the ECHO Database: Informal, Formal, and Judicial and 
coded them 0-2, with informal being the lowest level (0) and judicial the highest 
level (2). Coding the character variable of enforcement type into a new variable 
labeled “Enforcement?” greatly simplified the analysis and allowed for an ordered 
probit model. 
Once district demographic values were obtained, coding these variables was 
fairly simple. I did take the liberty of using the % vote for Obama in the previous 
election as the measure for “District Ideology”. Aside from the party identification 
of the member of Congress representing a district, I feel this is a measure that is 
independent of choice for a candidate for Congress and therefore a more reliable 
measure of district ideology, as the % vote for Obama did not always correlate with 
choice for representative. 
 
In terms of coding for congressional attributes for each district in each 
given year, the process was much more tedious and required decisions to be made 
regarding the coding process. “Member of Congress Party ID” was the easiest 
measure to code, with 1 for “Republican” and 0 for “Democrat” but that is where 
the simplicity ended. In the midst of combing through 435 members of Congress 
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for each of six years, I realized that due to redistricting and mobility within states, 
many members of Congress served in multiple districts during the time studied.  To 
account for this in “MoC Terms in Office”, I manually tallied the number of terms 
served, regardless if they were from another district. This may not be the most 
efficient way of coding, but seemed the best to capture what I wanted from this 
particular variable which was to quantify experience and entrenchment in 
Congress. 
In regards to the League of Conservation Voter Scores, I chose to use a 
member’s lifetime score for the year 2015, due to the 2015 scorecard being 
unavailable at the time of coding.  If 2015 was the first year for a representative 
and there was no lifetime score, I used the average LCV score for that particular 
district over the course of the preceding 10 years. LCV scorecards do not record a 
score for the Speaker of the House, so the Speaker’s score was omitted from 
analysis each year. In addition, if the member of Congress was absent or vacant for 
too many votes to record a score, I omitted the LCV score from that particular 
district for that specific year. If a representative split a term with another person 
during the year, the LCV score recorded was for the representative that was present 
for a majority of votes in that particular year. 
Spatial Analysis 
 
In using ArcGIS to place violating firms into respective congressional 
Districts, choices had to be made in regards to what cases to throw out and how to 
code special cases. Cases were only thrown out and not spatially coded when there 
was either no information given for the location, or vague information such as only 
30 
 
 
  
 
the state in which the firm was located. Even with throwing out some cases I was 
left with around 26,000 cases out of the 27,500 I started with—a 94% success rate 
in geocoding. 
Offshore violations presented another issue. Specifically in the Gulf of 
Mexico, many violations occurred in the state waters just off the coast.  I coded 
these violations as having occurred in the congressional district closest in proximity 
to the offshore site, using features of ArcGIS. 
Once the firms were plotted according to the year in which they were in 
violation, I had to use the specific shapefile associated with each new set of district 
lines for the period studied.
4
 This was necessary to ensure that as the district lines 
moved, so did my classification of which district was tied to each violating firm in 
order to create an accurate analysis of the factors at play. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 See Appendix B for variable source information. 
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     Appendix B 
Sources of Information for Variables Used 
Variable Source 
Firm characteristics, 
including enforcement 
outcomes 
"Integrated Compliance Information System for Federal 
Civil Enforcement Case Data 
(ICIS FE&C Data)." EPA Enforcement Compliance 
History Online: Data Downloads. Accessed October 
10, 2015. https://echo.epa.gov/tools/data- 
downloads#downloads. 
EPA Budgetary 
Information 
"EPA's Budget and Spending." EPA. February 12, 2016. 
Accessed February 16, 2016. 
http://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget. 
Firm Location "Facility Registry Service: Facilities and Linkages." EPA 
Enforcement Compliance 
History Online: Data Downloads. Accessed October 
10, 2015. https://echo.epa.gov/tools/data- 
downloads#downloads. 
Per Capita GDP and 
Unemployment Rate per 
District per Year 
Census Bureau. "American FactFinder: ACS 1 Year 
Surveys." American FactFinder: 
American Community Survey. Accessed December 
27, 2015. 
http://factfinder.census.gov/legacy/aff_sunset.html. 
District Ideology Singer, Jeff. "Daily Kos Elections: Statewide Election 
Results by Congressional and 
Legislative Districts." Daily Kos. September 7, 2013. 
Accessed November 21, 2015. 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/09/1220127/- 
Daily-Kos-Elections-2012-election-results-by- 
congressional-and-legislative- 
districts?detail=hide#AL. 
Member of Congress 
Party ID and Terms 
Served 
Civic Impulse, LLC. "Members of Congress Profile." 
GovTrack.us. Accessed December 
12, 2015. 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/current#. 
Member of Congress 
LCV Score 
League of Conservation Voters. "LCV Scorecards: 2010- 
2014." League of Conservation 
Voters Scorecard. Accessed October 8, 2015. 
http://scorecard.lcv.org/. 
Congressional District 
Filters for GIS 
Lewis, Jeffrey B., Brandon Devine, Lincoln Pritcher, and 
Kenneth C. Martis. "United States Congressional 
Shapefiles." United States Congressional District Shapefiles. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 1 (without regional or year dummy variables)        
 Goodness of Fit
a 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 12922.999 4009 3.223 
Scaled Deviance 12922.999 4009  
Pearson Chi-Square 80956.172 4009 20.194 
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 80956.172 4009  
Log Likelihoodb -7214.016   
Akaike's Information Criterion 
(AIC) 
14466.032   
Finite Sample Corrected AIC 
(AICC) 
14466.063   
Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) 
14619.789   
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 14638.789   
Dependent Variable: ordinal values 
Model: (Threshold), MOCParty, Region, MOCLCV, MOCTerms, 
UnemRateDis, UnemRateNatl, MedianHouseholdIncome, 
EnforcementBudget, EPABudget 
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form. 
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing 
information criteria. 
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Table 2: Regression with Budget and LCV as Separate Predictors 
Coefficients
a 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 18691.571 5683.904  3.289 .005 
EnforcementBudget -1.139E-5 .000 -.342 -1.360 .195 
a. Dependent Variable: CountofEnforcements 
b. Number of Observations: 16 
c. R Square= .117 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficients
a 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -4323.534 10268.747  -.421 .680 
AverageLCV 332.329 218.465 .377 1.521 .150 
a. Dependent Variable: CountofEnforcements 
b. Number of Observations: 16 
c. R Square= .142 
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